SAIPAR Case Review
Volume 5
Issue 1 Special Edition in Honour of Chief
Justice Mumba Malila (April 2022)

Article 21

4-2022

Zambia Breweries Plc v. Betternow Family Limited Selected
Judgment No. 48 of 2016
Chanda Chungu
University of Zambia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr
Part of the African Studies Commons, Commercial Law Commons, and the Contracts Commons

Recommended Citation
Chungu, Chanda (2022) "Zambia Breweries Plc v. Betternow Family Limited Selected Judgment No. 48 of
2016," SAIPAR Case Review: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 21.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/scr/vol5/iss1/21

This Case Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in SAIPAR Case Review by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Zambia Breweries Plc v. Betternow Family Limited Selected Judgment No. 48 of 2016
Chanda Chungu 8
Facts
This matter dealt with a distributorship contract between Zambia Breweries and Betternow
Family Limited. Betternow paid K100, 000 as a pre-condition to trading Zambia Breweries’
products – but after three (3) months of trading, Zambia Breweries terminated the supply of its
products to Betternow Family Limited.
In this case, the contract provided that the contract can be terminated with one month’s notice.
The contract was cancelled by Zambia Breweries and Betternow Family Limited sued for
breach of contract. The trial court awarded damages equivalent to the unserved or remaining
period of the contract.
Holding
The Supreme Court per Malila JS (as he was then) held that:
Any damages awarded should have taken the notice period for determination of the
agreement into account. As we stated in Swarp Spinning Plc v. Chileshe and Others in
assessing damages to be paid and which are appropriate in each case, the court should
not forget the general rule which applies. This is that the normal measure of damages
applies and will usually relate to the applicable contractual length of notice or the
notional reasonable notice, where the contract is silent.
The Supreme Court was adamant and confirmed the principle from Mobil Oil that the award
of damages should take into consideration the fundamental principle that where the contract
breaker had a contractual option to terminate the contract, the court should assess the damages
on the footing that the party in breach would have exercised the option.
Therefore, in this case, an award of damages for the unserved portion of the contract was set
aside because this award went beyond the loss that Betternow Family Limited would have
incurred as the contract provided for one month’s notice and as such that amount that would
have been earned during the notice period should have been awarded as damages and not what
would have been earned had the contract ran its full course.
The Supreme Court held that Betternow Family Limited was only entitled to be paid damages
for breach of contract equivalent to the notice period for termination of the contract – because
that was the extent of the loss that needed to be compensated with damages. This case
underscores the principle that damages should be awarded to compensate a party for the extent
of their loss, which in this case was what would have been earned during the one-month notice.
Significance
This case is significant because it deals with the crucial topic of liquidated damages under the
law of contract. Liquidated damages are an amount that is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss
likely to be caused to or suffered by one party if the contract is broken by the other party. In
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this case it is called ‘liquidated damages’ and it constitutes the amount, no more or less, that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the event of the breach without being required to prove
actual damage. Malila JS (as he was then) in another decision of the Supreme Court in Damales
Mwansa v Ndola Lime Company Limited 9 defined liquidated damages as
damages which have been agreed between the contracting parties in advance of any
breach of contract. They are not the equivalent of compensation, rather they form an
acceptable and agreed alternative to compensation. The amount agreed needs to be a
genuine estimate of what loss is likely to be, but in the event that amount could be,
indeed is likely to be, either greater or less than the actual loss.
In other words, liquidated damages are ascertained and agreed beforehand by the parties to the
contract. Having laid down the amount to be paid by either party on breach, it follows that the
only dispute will be as to the breach itself, not the damages.
These damages are embodied in clauses in the contract that effectively make a genuine
assessment of the losses which are likely to occur because of a breach of contract. Thus,
liquidated damages will generally stipulate what sum is payable in the event of a breach.
Another type of clause is the penalty clause, which is intended as a punishment for the person
breaching the contract. Penalty clauses are void and are disregarded in actions for breach of
contract. This is because any clause providing for a greater sum than the actual loss is prima
facie void. In Bridge v Campbell Discount Co, 10 a depreciation clause in a hire purchase
agreement for a car bore no relation to actual depreciation in value. The clause was declared
void as a penalty.
Secondly, the amount may be a threat held over the other party in terrorem (to frighten the
other party)-a security to the promisee that the contract will be performed. A sum of this nature
is called a ‘penalty’ and is designed to compel the other party to perform the contract.
Liquidated damages are enforceable, and penalty clauses are not enforceable beyond the
amount of the injured party’s actual loss. Thus, the party who brings an action for the
enforcement of the penalty can recover compensation only for the damage that he in fact
suffered, and as such he is not entitled to recover the amount stated in the contract if he has not
in fact suffered so much loss.
Sometimes, the amount of damages payable on breach is not merely an agreed and reasonable
compensation, but is more and amounts to a penalty. The law does not permit penalty clauses
because they seek to put the innocent party in a far great position than compensating them for
the loss they suffered. The Zambia Breweries v. Betternow decision is helpful as it seeks to
distinguish between liquidated damages and penalties.
Whether a particular sum is a liquidated damages or penalty is a matter of construction and
depends on the intention of the parties. In Law v. Redditch Local Board, 11 the court per Lopez
J stated that:
The distinction between penalties and liquidated damages depends on the intention of
the parties to be gathered from the whole of the contract. If the intention is to secure
performance of the contract by the imposition of a fine or penalty, then the sum
(2012) ZR (3) 268.
[1962] AC 600.
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specified is a penalty; but if, on the other hand, the intention is to asses the damages for
breach of the contract, it is liquidated damages.
To guide on excessive damages, that could be punitive in nature, Malila JS made reference to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mobil Oil Zambia Limited v Ramesh M Patel 12 which dealt
with a dealership contract whereby Mr Patel operated the Mobil Oil's service station for a
monthly licence fee. The contract could be terminated by either side on one month's notice.
The respondent frequently complained, inter alia, of losses through leakages of fuel from tanks.
When Mr Patel fell behind with payments for products sold and delivered, Mobil Oil
commenced proceedings for money owed and possession of the premises. Mr Patel counterclaimed for losses through leakages and loss of profits from the date when the appellant stopped
deliveries of fuel until the date of the hearing. Ngulube DCJ said:
it seems obvious to us that the defendant should not have been allowed to recover loss
of profits in respect of the breach by the plaintiff, for what was virtually an indefinite
period. The defendant had calculated his loss of profits, by the month, from October
1984, when deliveries of fuel stopped, right down to 11 March 1986, when he gave
evidence in the witness box. This is clearly an unacceptable way of compensating a
party for loss of profits as a result of the deliberate refusal, of which he was aware, by
the other party to perform his part of the contract. The renunciation of the contract by
the plaintiff in effect resulted in its wrongful termination. Where, as here, the contractbreaker had a contractual option to terminate the contract, the Court should assess the
damages on the footing that the party in breach would have exercised the option …
Indeed, this is frequently done in employment cases and the principle is equally
applicable to the facts of this case. In our considered view, therefore, the damages for
breach of contract, in terms of loss of profit for non-supply of fuel, should be limited to
a period of one month, such being the period of notice to terminate specified in the
contract.
The courts are reluctant to allow a plaintiff to recover for ‘virtually an indefinite period’. In
essence, the Supreme Court only awarded one month’s worth of loss of profit as damages, as
this is the greatest possible loss and would put the entity in a position it would have been but
for the breach, as the contract itself provided for one month’s notice.
The approach has been maintained in subsequent Zambian cases dealing with damages. In the
National Airports Corporation Limited v Reggie Ephraim Zimba and Savior Konie case, 13 the
court awarded the payment of damages equal to the period of notice, in part because the
employee managed to find alternative employment and hence the employee’s greatest loss was
limited to the three months’ notice.
The court referred to the landmark English decision of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New
Garage & Motor Co Ltd 14 cited above where the House of Lords held that even if there is a
fixed sum to be paid when a party to fails to perform under a contract, the court will not award
the amount in damages if the amount is unconscionably high. The English court held that the
court will in such circumstances award damages equivalent to the greatest loss that could
conceivably be proved following from the breach. Ngulube CJ, who delivered the judgment
on behalf of the Supreme Court held:
SCZ Judgment No 2 of 1988.
SCZ Judgment No 35 of 2000.
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We find and hold that the phrase invoked so as to pay damages as if the contract had
run its full course offends the rules which were first propounded as proposition by Lord
Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited vs New Garage and Motor
Company Limited …, especially that the resulting sum stipulated for is in effect bound
to be extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest loss
that could conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach. This part of the
appeal has to succeed and the damages directed to be assessed as we have indicated and
not as ordered below … where the contract-breaker had a contractual option to
terminate the contract, the court should assess the damages on the footing that the party
in breach would have exercised the option.
The Supreme Court in Reggie Ephraim Zimba was therefore on terra firma when it varied the
quantum of damages of the court below by ordering that the respondent was only entitled to
damages relating to the period of three months’ salary and perquisites and any other accrued
benefits, such as gratuity over that period. The Supreme Court provided that if they awarded
damages equating to the remaining part of the contract, such a sum of damages would be too
extravagant and unconscionable, as the role of the courts is to award the greatest loss that could
conceivably be proved to have followed from the breach – to put the innocent party in the
position they would have been but for the loss.
Guided by the decisions in Mobil Oil Zambia and Reggie Ephraim Zimba, the court in the
Zambia Breweries case, confirmed that damages are limited to the notice period that is provided
for in the contract. Damages amounting to the duration of the contract defeat the purpose of
damages in contract law which is to compensate one for the loss suffered. Anything more, such
as damages equivalent to the unexpired period of the contract amounts to a penalty which is
not permitted in contract law. The objective of damages is not to punish the guilty party, but
rather, compensate the innocent party only for the extent of the loss, taking into consideration
the fact that any party can terminate the contract.
A slight criticism of an otherwise brilliant judgment is the failure by the Supreme Court to take
the opportunity to give guidance on the factors that could be used to determine what constitutes
a penalty clause. At the moment, the only guidance is from the British case of Dunlop
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd, 15 which laid down various tests to
determine whether a liquidated damages clause is a penalty clause:
(1) If the sum stipulated is ‘extravagant and unconscionable’ in relation to the greatest
conceivable loss that could follow the breach, then it will be held to be a penalty.
(2) Payment of a large sum for a failure to settle a small debt is probably a penalty.
(3) Where breach consists of the non-payment of a sum of money and the sum payable
upon breach is greater than the sum which was meant to be paid, then this is penalty.
(4) A single sum operating in respect of a variety of different breaches is likely to be a
penalty.
(5) In the event that a lump sum is payable on the occurrence of one, or more or perhaps
several events, some harmful and some not so harmful, then the lump sum is
presumed (but no more) to be a penalty.
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(6) However, a sum is not prevented from being liquidated damages merely by the fact
that precise pre-estimation of the loss is impossible. 16
(7) The wording used by the parties is not necessarily conclusive.
(8) It is no bar to recovering a liquidated sum that actual assessment of the loss was
impossible before the contract.
The above principles can be read in conjunction with the Supreme Court decision to determine
whether the nature and scope of liquidated damages in contracts are valid or amount to a penalty
clause that will not be enforced.
Lastly, the Supreme Court confirmed the principle of mitigating one’s loss which entails taking
reasonable action to minimise or reduce the amount of loss when you have suffered loss from
breach of contract or unfair conduct. Malila JS on behalf of the Supreme Court held that: In any case, the learned trial judge did not take into account the need to mitigate. In
Eastern Cooperative Union Ltd. v. Yamene Transport Ltd we pointed out that it is
always the duty of the plaintiff to minimize his loss and where the plaintiff fails to do
so he cannot expect the court to award damages which will be limitless both as to time
and extent. The aspect of mitigation should have exercised the learned trial judge's mind
if he believed that this was a proper case in which to award damages beyond those
calculable with reference to the notice period for termination.
Put simply, mitigating loss, means lessening or diminishing the effects and gravity of a serious
or severe situation resulting from breach of contract. Therefore, when courts award damages,
the Supreme Court affirmed that they will only award the greatest possible loss an innocent
party would face.

See also Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltd v Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20, which seems to suggest
that the amount payable is limited to the amount stipulated in the liquidated damages clause. This is the case
regardless of the fact that possible damages have been underestimated.
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